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SIGNIFICANT MONTANA CASES
Lauren Amongero, Anne M. Lewis & Forrest Graves*
I. INTRODUCTION
Much like previous volumes, this year’s iteration of Significant Mon-
tana Cases presents several consequential Montana Supreme Court deci-
sions and their likely effects on Montana law. The Montana Law Review
remains committed to analyzing issues and changes to the legal playing
field that are relevant to Montana practitioners. This year, many of the most
important—and unprecedented—shifts in Montana’s legal system, how-
ever, were not captured in case law. On top of a contentious presidential
election and the beginning of a nationwide racial reckoning, 2020 brought
the first worldwide pandemic in over 100 years.1 The judiciary responded
accordingly.
On March 13, 2020, Chief Justice McGrath directed that courts release
“at risk” individuals from jury duty and mandated that courts give parties
the option to request a continuance or bench trial.2 Later that same week,
Justice McGrath asked courts to prioritize criminal matters and delay all
civil jury matters.3 On March 27, the Court changed its prior suggestions to
mandates, ordering that all criminal and civil jury trials be suspended until
April 10 at the earliest.4 In line with the nationwide shift to remote interac-
tion, the Court ordered telephonic or video appearances for emergency civil
matters and criminal hearings.5 These measures were extended through
May 4,6 but remote appearances, the presence of hand sanitizer and face
coverings in courthouses, juror excusal, and physical distancing became
long-term mandates.7
* Montana Law Review Staff Members 2020–21.
1. 100 Years Since the Great Influenza Pandemic: CDC Updates Regulations for a Modern Era,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Apr. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/843X-H3EM.
2. Memorandum from Mike McGrath, Chief Justice of the Montana Supreme Court, to Montana
District Court Judges and Clerks et al. 2 (Mar. 13, 2020) (copy on file with the Montana Supreme
Court).
3. Memorandum from Mike McGrath, Chief Justice of the Montana Supreme Court, to Montana
District Court Judges and Clerks et al. 1, 2 (Mar. 17, 2020) (copy on file with the Montana Supreme
Court).
4. In The Matter of the Statewide Response by Montana State Courts to the COVID-19 Public
Health Emergency 2 (Mar. 27, 2020).
5. Id. at 2, 5.
6. Memorandum from Mike McGrath, Chief Justice of the Montana Supreme Court, to Montana
District Court Judges and Clerks et al. (Apr. 22, 2020) (copy on file with the Montana Supreme Court).
7. See generally Memorandum from Mike McGrath, Chief Justice of the Montana Supreme Court,
to Montana District Court Judges and Clerks et al. (Dec. 21, 2020) (copy on file with the Montana
Supreme Court).
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Perhaps most consequentially for prospective Montana attorneys, the
Court denied a petition to be admitted to the bar without taking the bar
exam.8 Petitioners included current law school students who alleged that the
safety measures that were put in place for the bar exam were “insufficient to
mitigate the risk” of COVID-19 and further argued that the temporary rules
the Court adopted were not comprehensive “to address the risks to all ex-
aminees.”9 Petitioners sought remedies from the Court that included di-
ploma privilege, permanent waiver of the requirement to pass the bar exam,
and, in the alternative, installation of additional safety measures during the
bar examination.10 The Court reasoned the bar exam evaluates competency
through a “rigid” and “uniform” standard that requires admission to the
profession in the interests of the public.11 The Court held the Montana
Board of Bar Examiners undertook sufficient safety precautions to mitigate
risks to examinees, including the requirement that all examinees wear
masks during the examination.12 Further, the Court held it could not grant
diploma privilege because such a privilege would harm the practice of law
since “14 or 15 individuals would be admitted to the practice of law in this
State who would otherwise not be admitted.”13
In the years to come, and as Montanans slowly transition back to life
before the pandemic, we hope that this introduction will help serve as a
small reminder of some of the challenges Montana practitioners faced in
2020 and may also evidence lasting changes in the legal profession.
II. BUCKLES V. BH FLOWTEST, INC.14
In Buckles v. BH Flowtest, Inc., the Montana Supreme Court held that
Montana law, not North Dakota law, applied in a wrongful death suit, even
though the injury occurred in North Dakota, because Montana had the most
significant relationship to the litigation.15
In 2014, Glasgow, Montana resident Zachary Scott Buckles
(“Zachary”) died from hydrocarbon vapor exposure while manually gaug-
ing oil-production tanks on a well site in North Dakota owned by Continen-
tal Resources, Inc. (“Continental”).16 Continental, an Oklahoma corporation
doing business in Montana, had a Master Service Contract with BH
8. Order, In re Rules for Admission to the Bar of Montana (Mont. 2020) (AF 11-0244).
9. Id. at 1.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 3.
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id.
14. 476 P.3d 422 (Mont. 2020).
15. Id. at 423, 428.
16. Id. at 423.
2
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Flowtest.17 BH Flowtest subcontracted with Black Rock, who then subcon-
tracted with Black Gold––all three being Montana business entities––for
manual gauging of Continental’s crude oil tanks.18 Zachary worked for
Black Gold Testing (“Black Gold”).19
In 2015, Zachary’s mother Nicole R. Buckles (“Buckles”) filed a
wrongful death action on behalf of Zachary’s estate in Montana’s Seventh
Judicial District Court, Richland County, against Continental, BH Flowtest,
Black Rock, and Black Gold.20 In district court, Black Rock filed a motion,
joined by BH Flowtest, asking the district court to apply North Dakota law
to Buckles’s claims.21 Buckles argued Montana law applied because the
conduct that caused the injury occurred in Montana and the relationship
between the parties was centered in Montana.22 Judge Olivia C. Rieger de-
nied the motion holding that Montana law applied.23 After the denial, Black
Rock and BH Flowtest (“Appellants”) filed a consolidated appeal.24
The Montana Supreme Court considered on de novo review whether
Montana or North Dakota substantive law governed Buckles’s cause of ac-
tion.25 Applying the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the Court
agreed with the district court that Montana law applied.26
Following the Restatement’s two-step analysis, the Court first deter-
mined there was no statutory directive with respect to tort claims in Mon-
tana.27 Because there was no statutory directive stating which state law ap-
plied, the Court turned to the principles in Section 6(2) of the Restate-
ment.28 Before examining the principles in § 6(2), the Court began with the
presumption that the appropriate choice of law is that of the state where the
injury occurred.29 Even so, the Court noted this presumption is refuted, and
the law of the place of injury will not apply, when another state has a
“[more] significant relationship” with the issue.30
Noting the Court’s rejection of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti






22. Id. at 426.
23. Id. at 422–23.
24. Id. at 424.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 424, 428.
27. Id. at 424–25; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1971)
(“A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on
choice of law.”).
28. Buckles, 476 P.3d at 424–25.
29. Id. at 425; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 146–47.
30. Buckles, 476 P.3d at 425; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 145(1).
3
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Court first considered the contacts in Section 145(2) to then use when ap-
plying the principles in Section 6(2).31 Of the four factors to consider, the
Court found that only § 145(2)(a), the place where the injury occurred, fa-
vored North Dakota.32
The Court determined that § 145(2)(b), the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred, favored Montana because Buckles had been
dispatched from Montana to work in North Dakota at an oil-production site
that was controlled from Montana, and that Appellants had failed to provide
Buckles with the appropriate equipment and training before sending him to
work in North Dakota.33 The Court found that § 145(2)(c) regarding domi-
cile, residence, and place of incorporation also favored Montana because
Buckles was a Montana resident and Appellants are Montana corporations
with their principal places of business in-state.34 Last, the Court determined
that § 145(2)(d), or the place where the relationship between the parties was
centered, again favored Montana because Buckles was hired, contracted,
and compensated to work in Montana.35
Having examined the contacts in § 145(2), the Court returned to the
seven principles in § 6(2) to be applied when there is no statutory directive
on choice of law.36 Section 6(2)(a) considers “the needs of the interstate and
international systems.”37 The Court determined this principle weighed to-
wards Montana law because the “harmonious relationship” between Mon-
tana and North Dakota would not be furthered if Montana was unable to
apply its law in disputes among Montana citizens and entities.38 Thus, Mon-
tana has strong policy interests in its ability to resolve these cases.39
Next, the Court considered Sections 6(2)(b) and (c), the policies of the
forum and other interested states, as two of the most important factors when
a person is injured outside their state of residence.40 The Court discussed
Montana’s strong policy interest in safeguarding Montanans who perform
inherently dangerous activities by holding employers strictly liable.41 The
Court also noted that Montana’s comparative negligence statutes represent
Montana’s strong policy interest in distributing liability among those re-
sponsible for a resident’s injury. Because the Court found Montana’s policy
31. Buckles, 476 P.3d at 425–26 (citing Phillips v. General Motors Corp., 995 P.2d 1002 (Mont.
2000)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 145(2).




36. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6(2).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6(2)(a).
38. Buckles, 476 P.3d at 426–27.
39. Id. at 426–27; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6(2)(a), cmt. d.
40. Buckles, 476 P.3d at 427.
41. Id.
4
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objectives to be stronger and more specific, compared to North Dakota’s
more “general policy objective[s],” it found these factors to favor Montana
law.42
The Court determined § 6(2)(d) to be neutral to the case because tort
cases do not usually involve protecting the justified expectations of the par-
ties.43 Next, the Court did not find § 6(2)(e), the basic policies underlying
the particular field of law, applicable because Montana and North Dakota
law differed so greatly in tort liability.44
Last, Sections 6(2)(f) and (g) consider the certainty, predictability, and
uniformity of the result, and the ease in the law’s determination and appli-
cation.45 The Court stated that these factors, too, favored application of
Montana law because certainty, predictability, uniformity, and ease of de-
termination and application in result are all furthered when the conduct
takes place in Montana and involves Montana individuals and companies.46
The Court disagreed with the Appellants’ argument, that the § 6(2) factors
favor North Dakota law, and found the two cases cited by the Appellants to
be distinguishable because those cases did not involve parties whose rela-
tionships were centered in Montana by residence or incorporation.47
Ultimately, based upon the contacts considered in Section 145(2) and
the principles in Section 6(2), the Court affirmed the district court’s ruling
and held Montana law applied because Montana had the most significant
relationship to Buckles’s claims.48
Justice Laurie McKinnon dissented, joined by Justices Beth Baker and
Jim Rice.49 Justice McKinnon argued that North Dakota had the “most sig-
nificant relationship” with Buckles’s claims and disagreed with the major-
ity’s “conclusory discussion” of the Section 6(2) factors.50 She asserted the
majority incorrectly held that Montana law applied to the dispute, finding it
inconsistent with the “most significant relationship” test and the Court’s
holding in Phillips.51
Justice McKinnon believed the majority inappropriately focused its
analysis on the domiciles of the parties, arguing that choice of law analyses
42. Id.
43. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“the
protection of justified expectations”).
44. Buckles, 476 P.3d at 427–28.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 6(2)(f)–(g) (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
46. Buckles, 476 P.3d at 428.
47. Id. (citing Otto v. Newfield Expl. Co., No. CV 15-66-BLG-SPW, 2016 WL 9461791 (D. Mont.
July 26, 2016); Winter v. Pioneer Drilling Serv., Ltd., No. CV-14-20-GF-BMM, 2015 WL 9855923 (D.
Mont. May 14, 2015)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 434.
50. Id. at 429–34 (McKinnon, J., with Baker, Rice, JJ., dissenting).
51. Id. at 429–30 (citing Phillips v. General Motors Corp., 995 P.2d 1002 (Mont. 2000)).
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require a broader focus on the particular issue and the state interests at
play.52 She argued that all of Buckles’s claims––negligence, negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium––took place in North
Dakota.53 Justice McKinnon summarized Buckles’s claims as unsafe well
site conditions, and argued it was that issue that should be analyzed under
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.54
Following, Justice McKinnon provided her own analysis of the factors
in Section 145(2).55 Under § 145(2)(a), the injury occurred in North Da-
kota. Under § 145(2)(b), according to Justice McKinnon, the place where
the conduct causing the injury occurred also favored North Dakota because
it is most likely that any failure to provide a safe work environment oc-
curred at the well site in North Dakota.56 Under the domicile consideration
in § 145(2)(c), she noted that although Buckles was a Montana resident, he
was living in North Dakota at the time of his death, and that Buckles and
the Appellants were both conducting business in North Dakota.57 Last,
under § 145(2)(d), Justice McKinnon argued that the place where the rela-
tionship between the parties centered also favored North Dakota because
the parties’ connection was “centered” around their “common objective” of
working the well site.58
Next, turning to § 6(2), Justice McKinnon focused her analysis on the
place of the injury because, she asserted, the location was “inextricably
tied” to the choice of law factors and supported the presumption that North
Dakota law applied.59 She argued that North Dakota had a greater policy
interest than Montana in the safety of a workplace within North Dakota and
in encouraging and promoting oil and gas development in the state.60 She
cautioned that if a worksite could be subject to any state’s laws based on the
domicile of any worker “a mess” of unpredictability would result.61
Justice McKinnon believed that the majority’s decision was influenced
by its perception that Buckles would receive an “unfair result” if North
Dakota law applied and argued the opinion will promote forum shopping.62
Justice McKinnon argued that the majority disregarded North Dakota’s pol-
icy interests, as if none existed, in favor of Montana’s policy.63 She argued
52. Id.







60. Id. at 431.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 432.
63. Id.
6
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that the majority’s decision would lead to “uncertainty, unpredictability,
and a lack of uniformity.”64 Accordingly, Justice McKinnon would have
held that North Dakota had the “most significant relationship” to Buckles’s
claims.65
Continental’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Su-
preme Court was denied.66
Montana practitioners should note Buckles, as it reveals how the ma-
jority weighs factors in choice of law disputes. As evinced here, the Court
does not agree on how those factors are analyzed and applied.
––Lauren Amongero
III. STATE V. THOMAS67
In State v. Thomas, the Montana Supreme Court held that Stephen
Thomas (“Stephen”) did not automatically lose his legitimate expectation of
privacy in his residence when renting from a person on probation.68
In 2016, Stephen and his gravely ill wife had been homeless for almost
a year.69 While Stephen and his wife were renting a room at a hotel they
learned that an employee’s sister, Parischere Hughes (“Paris”), had an “out-
building” in her backyard for rent.70 Stephen met with Paris, whom he did
not know, and they agreed Stephen and his wife would rent the outbuilding
for $400 per month.71 Stephen and his wife lived in the outbuilding, moved
out, and then returned.72 Stephen continued to live in the outbuilding alone
after his wife died.73
Paris owned and lived in the trailer on the property.74 The outbuilding
was detached from the primary trailer residence, but both were located
64. Id. at 433.
65. Id. at 434.
66. Continental Res. Inc. v. Buckles ex rel., 592 U.S. ___ (2020) (cert. denied). Throughout this
appeal, Continental Resources petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Conti-
nental sought review under a specific personal jurisdiction theory, mainly, that their contacts in Montana
had nothing to do with its case-related contacts in North Dakota. See generally Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 1–3, Cont’l Resources, Inc. v. Buckles ex rel., https://perma.cc/PHM9-BG66 (U.S. Sept. 18,
2020) (No. 20-324). Moreover, given the Court’s granting certiorari in Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth
Judicial Dist., Continental sought at a minimum, a vacating of the Montana Supreme Court’s judgment
and a remand pending the outcome of Ford. Id. The Montana Supreme Court had been made aware of
this development as the case written on above was the third appeal—the prior two appeals were con-
cerned with personal jurisdiction. See Buckles, 476 P.3d at 424 n.1.
67. 471 P.3d 733 (Mont. 2020).
68. Id. at 734, 739.
69. Id. at 734.
70. Id. at 734–35.
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within a fenced yard.75 Stephen’s residence was modest, fitting a bed, desk,
and end tables.76 There was electricity, but the outbuilding did not have a
bathroom, kitchen, running water, or plumbing.77 Stephen spent most of his
time in the outbuilding and kept all of his and his wife’s possessions
there.78 Stephen would go into Paris’s trailer to use the toilet, shower, and
sometimes use the kitchen.79 He kept his residence locked with a padlock
that Paris had no access to.80 Paris did not use the outbuilding for any pur-
pose.81
Paris was on misdemeanor probation.82 Her sentencing order provided
that her residence and all places she had access to, including private rooms
of other persons, were subject to search at any time.83 Before Stephen and
his wife moved into the outbuilding, Paris’s probation officer, Gen Stasiak
(“Stasiak”), performed background checks and approved the rental.84
FIGURE 1
After Paris missed two drug and alcohol testing appointments, Stasiak












Montana Law Review, Vol. 82 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol82/iss2/9
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\82-2\MON209.txt unknown Seq: 9 31-AUG-21 13:06
2021 SIGNIFICANT MONTANA CASES 503
dence.85 At the time, Stephen was in his outbuilding but came outside when
he heard dogs barking.86 When he walked outside, he met an officer who
directed him to open the front door to Paris’s trailer.87 Stephen followed the
order.88 He did not lock his outbuilding.89 After searching Paris’s home,
Stasiak decided to search Stephen’s outbuilding as well.90 Stasiak did not
ask for Stephen’s permission to search the outbuilding and Stephen did not
consent to the search.91 Inside Stephen’s home the officers found an old
bottle of “Ipecac and opium powder” (see Figure 1), marijuana, and mari-
juana paraphernalia.92
Stephen testified that the bottle came from a pharmacy his wife’s fam-
ily had owned and was “sort of a family relic.”93 Stephen was later charged
with felony criminal possession of dangerous drugs for the opium bottle.94
The Eighteenth Judicial District Court for Gallatin County, Judge John
C. Brown, denied Stephen’s motion to suppress the evidence, holding that
the search was justified because Paris and Stephen were roommates, Paris’s
probation authorized the search of his room, and the room was unlocked
and accessible.95 Stephen appealed Judge Brown’s order.96
The Montana Supreme Court reviews district court findings of fact in
denials of suppression motions for clear error and interpretation and appli-
cation of the law for correctness.97
On appeal, Stephen argued the outbuilding was his separate residence
and he had not lost his legitimate expectation of privacy when he did not
lock the outbuilding.98 The State countered that Stephen’s room was subject
to search because it was not a separate residence and, because no lock was
on the door at the time of the search, it was reasonable to believe Paris had
access to the room.99
The Court began its analysis of the search with the constitutional guar-
antees of protection from unreasonable searches and seizures under the








92. Id. at 735.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 736.
95. Id. at 734, 736.
96. Id. at 736.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 736–37.
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11 of the Montana Constitution.100 The Court also cited Montanans’ ex-
plicit right to privacy in Article II, Section 10 as narrowing the searches
permissible without a warrant.101 The Court reiterated that it has “empha-
sized again and again that the entrance to the home is where the federal and
Montana constitution draw a firm line” and that warrantless searches of the
home are per se unreasonable, absent a valid warrant exception.102
The Court first considered whether Stephen had a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the outbuilding that he rented.103 The Court held the dis-
trict court’s finding that Stephen and Paris were roommates was clearly
erroneous because the undisputed evidence showed that Stephen and Paris
had entered into an “arms-length” rental agreement that gave Stephen ex-
clusive control of the outbuilding.104 The Court noted that although Stephen
was welcome to use Paris’s residence for necessities that the outbuilding
lacked, Paris did not similarly use or have access to the outbuilding.105
Next, the Court rejected the argument that Stephen’s legitimate expec-
tation of privacy was diminished because of Paris’s probation conditions.106
The Court agreed with Stephen that the search of his residence exceeded the
scope of the probationary search and noted that an individual’s privacy
rights are not lost “merely because he or she rents the residence from a
person on probation.”107
Last, the Court disagreed with the district court’s “excessively broad
interpretation” of State v. Finley.108 Likening the facts here to those in Fin-
ley, the district court held that Stephen lost his legitimate expectation of
privacy when he did not lock the outbuilding after walking outside to see
why the dogs were barking and meeting the officer.109 In Finley, Finley’s
wife was on probation when a probationary search revealed contraband in
an unlocked, open safe in their shared bedroom.110 Finley argued the proba-
tionary search exceeded its scope because the contents of the safe were his
alone, and his wife had no access to the safe.111 The Court disagreed, con-
cluding there were no facts to indicate that Finley’s wife did not have ac-
cess to the safe.112
100. Id. at 737.
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting State v. Therriault, 14 P.3d 444, 453 (Mont. 2000)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 737–38.
105. Id. at 737.
106. Id. at 738.
107. Id.
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Here, Stasiak concluded that Paris had access to the outbuilding be-
cause it was unlocked at the time of the search.113 Unlike in Finley, the
Court pointed to the fact that Stephen and Paris had entered into a rental
agreement that gave Stephen sole dominion of the detached outbuilding.114
The Court also noted Stephen and Paris were not in any sort of relationship
and did not share the outbuilding space.115 The Court held that Stephen did
not have to lock his residence to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
it.116 Ultimately, the Court held that the district court erred in denying Ste-
phen’s suppression motion and thus reversed his conviction for criminal
possession of dangerous drugs and remanded the case to be dismissed with
prejudice.117
Thomas is noteworthy for Montana practitioners working in criminal
law. This decision makes clear that the scope of probationary searches is
fact specific and that an individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy in
their home is not diminished simply because the home is rented from a
person on probation.
––Lauren Amongero*
IV. FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE V. WESSEL118
In Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Wessel, the Montana Supreme
Court held in part that when an insurance company does not have a duty to
defend under an insurance policy, it does not have a duty to indemnify.119
In doing so, the Court reversed the trial court’s determination that the duty
to indemnify issue was not judicially ripe.120
Kate Wessel and John Mehan (“Insureds”) purchased property in
Lewis and Clark County in 2008.121 At that time, two neighboring land-
owners (“Neighbors”) used a road running through the Insureds’ property to
access their own properties.122 The road was the only way to access Neigh-
bors’ properties.123 That same year, Insureds asked one of the Neighbors if
113. Id.




* The author discloses that the views expressed here do not reflect those of the Montana State
Office of the Appellate Defender.
118. 477 P.3d 1101 (Mont. 2020).
119. Id. at 1107.
120. Id.




Amongero et al.: <em>Significant Montana Cases</em>
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2021
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\82-2\MON209.txt unknown Seq: 12 31-AUG-21 13:06
506 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 82
they could recreate on their property.124 The Neighbors denied this request
because a conservation easement on the land prohibited motorized use.125
In response, Insureds refused to allow Neighbors to continue to use the
road through Insureds’ property.126 This prevented Neighbors from acces-
sing their own property, so they bought an access easement from a different
property owner next to the Insureds and built a new driveway.127 Insureds’
allegedly retaliatory conduct continued, ranging from the construction of
physical barriers on Neighbors’ new driveway to alleged violent threats.128
One of the Neighbors claimed that Insureds’ conduct forced the neighbor to
leave their home and prevented them from finding a buyer for the prop-
erty.129
In 2011, one of the Neighbors disappeared.130 His dismembered re-
mains were later found near McDonald Pass.131 John Mehan, one of the
Insureds, was arrested for felony assault with a weapon and felony evidence
tampering in relation to the law enforcement investigation into the death.132
The Neighbors sued Insureds for assault, trespass, civil conspiracy, and, in
the case of the deceased neighbor’s estate, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.133 All claims alleged intentional and purposeful action on
the part of the insureds.134
Insureds’ homeowners insurance provider, Farmers Insurance Ex-
change (“Farmers”), declined coverage over the claims because of the al-
leged intentional nature of the conduct.135 The First Judicial District Court
for Lewis and Clark County, Judge Michael McMahon, agreed and found
that Farmers owed no duty to defend Insureds under the policy.136 The dis-
trict court granted Farmers’ summary judgment motion, but declined to dis-
miss the claim entirely, holding that the duty to indemnify issue was not yet
ripe and therefore not justiciable.137 Insureds appealed Judge McMahon’s
decision to deny their discovery requests and the finding that Farmers did









132. Id. at 1103–04.
133. Id. at 1104.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1102.
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appealed, requesting a declaration on “[w]hether there can be a duty to in-
demnify in the absence of a duty to defend[.]”139 The Montana Supreme
Court quickly dispensed with the insureds’ discovery claim, finding that the
district court had not abused its discretion in denying the discovery re-
quests, because the insureds had not followed Rule 56(f) of the Montana
Rules of Civil Procedure.140
An insurer in Montana has a duty to defend an insured party when the
allegations in a complaint, if proven, would result in coverage for the in-
sured party under the insurance policy.141 The initial burden lies on the
insured party to prove that the claim lies within the policy’s coverage.142
The Court analyzed the language of Insureds’ homeowners policy based on
the complaints brought by Neighbors.143 Because the policy only covered
“occurrences” that were accidental, if the claimed occurrences were not ac-
cidental, but intentional, then they would not be covered by the policy.144
The Court affirmed the district court’s analysis that Neighbors’ claims all
alleged intentional—not accidental—conduct on the part of the insureds be-
cause the insureds allegedly acted “both intentional[ly] and . . . purposefully
. . . to cause injury and damages to the [Neighbors].”145 Because the claims
alleged intentional conduct, the Court affirmed that they did not constitute
accidental “occurrences” under the insurance policy and therefore did not
give rise to a duty for Farmers to defend the insureds.146
The duty to defend and the duty to indemnify are separate legal obliga-
tions.147 Because the duty to indemnify is only established once facts are
actually “proven, stipulated, or otherwise established” that give rise to the
insured’s liability,148 the duty to indemnify is narrower than the duty to
defend.149 The Court agreed with the district court that if the duty to defend
question remains unresolved, then whether there is a duty to indemnify is
not yet justiciable.150 The Court then noted that here, as already determined,
there is no duty to defend and the insurance policy does not cover the in-
sureds, so there was no duty to indemnify either.151 The Court definitively
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1106.
141. Id. at 1105 (citing Fire Ins. Exch. v. Weitzel, 371 P.3d 457, 461 (Mont. 2016)).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1105.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1106.
146. Id.
147. Id. (referencing Skinner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 127 P.3d 359 (Mont. 2005)).
148. Wessel, 477 P.3d at 1106 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Freyer, 312 P.3d 403,
410–11 (2013)).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1107.
151. Id.
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held that “a conclusion that there is no duty to defend compels the conclu-
sion that there is no duty to indemnify.”152
Before Wessel, the Court in Skinner v. Allstate Insurance Co.153 noted
that the analysis of whether there is a duty to defend or a duty to indemnify
are separate inquiries that might end in different conclusions. 154 For exam-
ple, even if a court finds that the insurance policy covers the claims, thus
establishing a duty to defend, a finder of fact may later determine that no
duty to indemnify exists.155 The Skinner court, however, did not answer
whether the duty to indemnify could exist without a duty to defend. The
Wessel court answered that question definitively in the negative.156
While perhaps not making any enormous leaps in determining the du-
ties of insurance companies in Montana, Wessel conclusively establishes
the scope of the duty to indemnify as it falls within the duty to defend in
insurance policies: if there is no duty to defend because the claims are not
covered by the insurance policy, then there is no duty to indemnify either.
Moving forward, Montana practitioners should look to Wessel when deter-
mining duties under an insurance policy.
––Forrest Graves
V. MURRAY V. BEJ MINERALS, LLC157
The Montana Supreme Court held that fossilized dinosaur bones were
not “minerals” as contemplated by the ordinary meaning of “mineral” in a
transfer deed.158 In so holding, the Court established that fossils should gen-
erally be considered a part of the surface estate rather than the mineral es-
tate if the contractual language in the deed does not say otherwise.159 The
Court’s majority established the ordinary meaning of “mineral” through
conventional methods of statutory interpretation, relying primarily on dic-
tionaries, statutory definitions, and regulatory guidance.160 Importantly for
Montana lawyers, however, Justice Laurie McKinnon penned a separate
concurrence in which she introduced and advocated for the use of corpus
linguistics as a new tool of statutory interpretation. Because of the novelty
of her suggestions, this essay summarizes the majority and dissent but
152. Id.
153. 127 P.3d 359 (Mont. 2005).
154. Id. at 363.
155. Id.
156. Wessel, 477 P.3d at 1106.
157. 464 P.3d 80 (Mont. 2020).
158. Id. at 93.
159. Id.
160. See generally Id. at 87–90.
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mainly focuses on corpus linguistics and Justice McKinnon’s related analy-
sis.
In 2013, BEJ Minerals, LLC (“BEJ”) asserted ownership over fossils
found on the Murrays’ property.161 At the time, the Murrays owned all sur-
face rights to the property where the bones were located but shared the
mineral rights with BEJ.162 The fossils in question included a rare formation
depicting “two dinosaurs locked in combat,” a triceratops skull, and “one of
only a dozen intact Tyrannosaurus rex skeletons of its quality ever found,”
the lot of which was worth millions of dollars.163 BEJ claimed the fossils
were minerals and should therefore belong in part to BEJ as holder of one-
third of the mineral estate.164
Upon removal to the United States District Court for the District of
Montana, Judge Susan P. Watters granted the Murrays’ motion for sum-
mary judgment, holding that fossils were “not included in the natural and
ordinary meaning of ‘mineral,’” so the mineral estate in question did not
include rights to the fossils.165 On appeal, a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
panel reversed.166 BEJ then petitioned for rehearing and rehearing en
banc.167 Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit certified this question to the
Montana Supreme Court: “[w]hether, under Montana law, dinosaur fossils
constitute ‘minerals’ for the purpose of a mineral reservation.”168
The Montana Supreme Court majority used a test established in prior
caselaw for what qualifies as a “mineral,” and grounded its opinion in an
interpretation of the contractual language in the deed in question.169 “Courts
[in Montana] interpret contracts according to their plain and ordinary mean-
ing,” and the Court restricted its analysis to the meaning of the words in the
deed itself.170 In determining whether the ordinary meaning of “mineral” as
used in the deed included fossils, the Court brushed aside the federal courts’
focus on individual dictionary definitions of the word “mineral,” opting in-
stead to find the meaning of the word by looking at the context in which it
was used.171 The Court also looked to various statutory and regulatory defi-
nitions of “mineral” and “fossil.”172 Because none of the “mineral” defini-




165. Id. at 83 (quoting Murray v. Billings Garfield Land Co., 187 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1204 (D. Mont.
2016)).
166. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 908 F.3d 437 (9th Cir. 2018).
167. Murray, 464 P.3d at 83.
168. Id. at 83.
169. Id. at 83–88.
170. Id. at 85.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 87–89.
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tions included fossils and the only “fossil” definitions were used in the nat-
ural history and paleontology contexts, the Court found that “minerals”
were not generally understood to include “fossils.”173
The Court also looked to the statutory interpretation maxim expressio
unius est exclusion alterius, or “the expression of one thing is the exclusion
of another.”174 The Court found it telling that the word “fossil” was not
included in the grant of the mineral interest in the deed, which included
“oil, gas, and hydrocarbons.”175 Given that the grant excluded fossils, the
Court found that the parties to the mineral deed shared an understanding
that fossils would not be included in the mineral interest.176
Justice Ingrid Gustafson dissented, joined by Justices Beth Baker and
Judge Olivia Reiger of the Seventh Judicial District for Dawson County.177
Justice Gustafson noted that the ordinary meaning analysis should be fact-
specific in this instance, questioning not whether fossils generally should be
considered minerals but whether the actual fossils at issue should be consid-
ered minerals under the deed in question.178 Using the same caselaw and
statutory definitions as the majority, Justice Gustafson asserted that because
fossils are “scientifically” made up of minerals and are “rare and valuable,”
they should be considered minerals for the purposes of the mineral deed
between the parties.179
A. The Concurrence and Corpus Linguistics
Justice McKinnon’s discussion of corpus linguistics remains the first
substantive mention of the interpretive tool in a published opinion in both
Montana and the Ninth Circuit.180 Her suggestions are part of a burgeoning
body of support for the tool in the legal context.
Corpus linguistics describes the relatively new practice of compiling
written language into databases, forming a body or “corpus” of language
that can then be searched and analyzed.181 Practically speaking, these mod-
ern linguistic corpora are created by consolidating documents into a
software program that allows a user to search the body of materials for a
173. Id. at 87–88.
174. Id. at 86–87. The Court has used expressio unius as a tool for statutory interpretation beginning
in at least 1881. See King v. Nat’l Mining & Exploring Co., 1 P. 727 (Mont. 1881).
175. Murray, 464 P.3d at 87.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 96.
178. Id. at 96–97.
179. Id. at 99–100.
180. Confirmed by a search of “corpus linguistics” in Westlaw Edge and Lexis+ conducted on April
9, 2021.
181. See Tommy Gales & Lawrence M. Solan, Revisiting a Classic Problem in Statutory Interpreta-
tion: Is a Minister a Laborer?, 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 491, 496–97 (2020).
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keyword, much like a simple Google search.182 Features within the corpus
search mechanism allow the user to measure the frequency of the words
surrounding the search word.183 This allows the user to consider the ordi-
nary meaning of the word based on the contexts in which it most frequently
occurs in written and spoken language, rather than from a decontextualized
dictionary definition.184
There are several corpora of linguistics data available online.185 One
has been consistently referenced by courts: the Corpus of Contemporary
American English (“COCA”).186 Because linguistic corpora vary in their
linguistic contents, the choice of corpus should be tailored to the statutory
language at issue, especially if the language is specialized or tied to a par-
ticular time period.187 COCA, for example, contains “over one billion
words of text . . . from eight genres,” including newspapers, magazines,
fiction, television, and movies dating from 1990–2019.188 In comparison,
the News on the Web (“NOW”) corpus contains 12.3 billion words accu-
mulated from internet news sources beginning in 2010 and updated
monthly.189
There are now dozens of scholarly articles referencing corpus linguis-
tics and statutory interpretation, most of which side with Justice McKinnon
in espousing the positive influence the tool could have on statutory interpre-
tation. Some scholars emphasize the benefits of corpus linguistics’ empiri-
cal and quantifiable nature,190 lending additional support for Justice McKin-
non’s concerns about the potential misuse of dictionary definitions. By ap-
plying corpus linguistics to past United States Supreme Court opinions,
legal scholars have shown that the new tool may lead to different ordinary
meaning outcomes at the highest judicial levels.191
In his 2019 article Against Corpus Linguistics, John Ehrett noted the
danger of eliminating the hierarchy of the sources from which words are
182. See for example Corpus of Contemporary American English, https://perma.cc/L2JD-KYGT
(last visited May 2, 2021).
183. Murray, 464 P.3d at 95.
184. Id.
185. Gales & Solan, supra note 181, at 501.
186. COCA is available at https://perma.cc/L2JD-KYGT. Other available corpora include (without
limitation): The Corpus of Historical American English (COHA), available at https://perma.cc/MX6N-
6YHK; Google Books Ngram Viewer, available at https://perma.cc/33CW-LF5G; and the NOW Corpus,
available at https://perma.cc/R9BZ-52QK.
187. Gales & Solan, supra note 181.
188. Corpus of Contemporary American English, supra note 182.
189. NOW Corpus (News on the Web), https://perma.cc/R9BZ-52QK (last visited May 2, 2021).
190. Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 829
(2018).
191. See id. (applying a corpus linguistics to Muscarello v. United States to determine the ordinary
meaning of “carry” with reference to a firearm and coming to a different conclusion than the Court).
17
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pulled.192 Because corpus databases compile language samples from a myr-
iad of sources into one searchable space, searchers cannot assess or validate
the credibility or importance of individual language sources.193 This could
limit judges’ ability to make fine-grained distinctions between the relative
strength or import of one source’s use of a word over another’s use.194
Ehrett also notes that users of corpus linguistic search databases do not
know what sources the creators of the database chose to include or ex-
clude.195 This could lead to materials from some classes, races, or other
groups being disproportionately represented in the corpus, leading to biased
search results.196 Ehrett also describes the burden on judges to correctly
execute searches in linguistic databases that can be difficult to interpret.197
Although corpus linguistics has been widely discussed in law journals
and scholarly treatises in recent years, its application by courts remains lim-
ited in scope. The Utah Supreme Court,198 the Michigan Supreme Court,199
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit200 have all
addressed the new tool in some capacity in reported opinions. In an April
2021 concurrence, United States Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito raised
the possibility of using corpus linguistics in concert with another canon of
statutory interpretation.201
Justice McKinnon began her concurrence by underscoring the previous
two Murray decisions in which the federal district court and the Ninth Cir-
cuit panel used the same dictionary and statutory definitions of ‘mineral’
but came to opposite conclusions.202 Justice McKinnon noted that this
“demonstrate[d] dependency on such authority may be less reliable than
convention holds.”203 She suggested that a corpus linguistics analysis would
have eliminated the initial dictionary conflict between courts and would
have led the Murray majority to the same conclusion it reached through its
conventional analysis.204
192. John S. Ehrett, Against Corpus Linguistics, 108 GEO. L. J. ONLINE 50, 61(2019).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 65–69.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 68–70.
198. State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1264 (2015) (Lee, J., concurring). (suggesting that the
Google News corpus be used to determine the meaning of “discharge” in relation to a firearm).
199. People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 839 (Mich. 2016) (using COCA search results to find com-
mon usages of the term “information”).
200. Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 439, 441 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J., concurring)
(suggesting corpus linguistics as a tool for statutory interpretation).
201. Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, ___S. Ct.___, 2021 WL 1215717 (Apr. 1, 2021) (Alito, J., concur-
ring).
202. Murray, 464 P.3d at 93.
203. Id. at 94.
204. Id. at 95–96.
18
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Justice McKinnon used COCA to show how common collocates of the
word “mineral” could be used to establish the word’s ordinary meaning.205
Collocates are “words that are statistically most likely to appear in the same
context as” the keyword.206 Analyzing a word’s collocates entails investi-
gating the relationship “between two or more words [that] have a tendency
to occur within a few words of each other.”207 The process follows the
premise that the meaning of words is shaped by its surrounding words.208
Through COCA, Justice McKinnon found that the most frequent collo-
cated nouns for “mineral” were “resource,” “oil,” “right,” and “deposit,” all
of which occurred within four words of the word “mineral” at least 200
times in the corpus materials.209 By contrast, the word “fossil” occurred
within 4 words of “mineral” only 69 times.210 The most common relevant
verbs collocated with “mineral” were “extract” and “mine.”211 Justice Mc-
Kinnon noted that the written materials in the corpus referring to “mineral”
and its most common collocates “overwhelmingly” referred to economic
contexts and resource extraction and exploitation.212 Her corpus linguistics
analysis supported the district court’s original holding that the common un-
derstanding of the word “mineral” relates to mining or resource extraction
for “economic exploitation.”213 This meaning also supported the majority’s
holding here. Because of the insights provided by a close analysis of the
collocates of “mineral,” Justice McKinnon suggested using corpus linguis-
tics as a tool for statutory interpretation in the future.214 Justice McKinnon
explicitly noted, however, that “Montana courts use, and will continue to
use, dictionary definitions” to help determine the ordinary meaning of con-
tract terms.215
Corpus linguistics is still in its early stages of development in the legal
field. Given its novelty, some scholars have valid concerns about over-rely-
ing on corpus linguistics as a tool for statutory interpretation. Most availa-
ble resources, however, tout corpus linguistics’ usefulness as a modern tool
for establishing the ordinary meaning of ambiguous statutory and contrac-
tual language. Any ordinary meaning analysis in Montana should continue
205. Id.
206. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 190, at 837.
207. Neal Goldfarb, A Lawyer’s Introduction to Meaning in the Framework of Corpus Linguistics,
2017 BYU L. REV. 1359, 1368–69 (2018) (quoting MICHAEL STUBBS, WORDS AND PHRASES: CORPUS
STUDIES OF LEXICAL SEMANTICS 24 (2001)).
208. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 190, at 832.
209. Murray, 464 P.3d at 96.
210. Id. at 95.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 96.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 93.
215. Id. at 96.
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to reference dictionary definitions as needed. Given the growing support for
corpus linguistics in the legal community, however, when dictionaries come
up in an ordinary meaning argument it may be persuasive to supplement the
tried-and-true dictionary belt with a corpus linguistics set of suspenders.
VI. REAVIS V. PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE
AGENCY216
In Reavis v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency, the
Montana Supreme Court held that a student loan borrower’s state law
claims against the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency
(PHEAA) did not constitute improper disclosure claims that would be ex-
pressly or implicitly preempted by the Higher Education Act (HEA), and
the borrower’s claims were not subject to conflict preemption by the
HEA.217 The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings
because the borrower’s claims survived dismissal.218
This case involves the federal student loan system established by the
HEA and the administration of such loans by a private loan servicer.219
Congress established the HEA in 1965 “to strengthen the educational re-
sources of our colleges and universities and to provide financial assistance
for students in postsecondary and higher education.”220 Since 2010, the De-
partment of Education (“DoEd”) has exclusively loaned funds to student
borrowers directly.221 The DoEd also contracts with private entities to ser-
vice loans to student borrowers.222 Student borrowers typically communi-
cate with their federal loan servicer opposed to the actual holder of their
debt.223 Student loan servicers assume several responsibilities, including re-
ceiving and applying payments to a borrower’s account and maintaining
account records.224 Student loan servicers interact with borrowers “to help
prevent default in obligations arising from post-secondary education loans
conducted to facilitate repayment.”225
Congress created the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program
(“PSLF”) in 2007.226 PSLF was established to encourage students to enter
216. 467 P.3d 588 (Mont. 2020).
217. Id. at 590, 595.
218. Id. at 595; M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
219. Reavis, 467 P.3d at 590.
220. Id. (citing Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs. Inc., 719 F.3d 818, 819 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Higher
Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, 1219 (1965)).




225. Id. (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 1090.106).
226. Id. at 590.
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public service careers promising student loan forgiveness.227 It requires a
borrower who has direct loans through the DoEd to make 120 on-time
monthly payments under a qualifying repayment program while working
for a qualifying public service employer.228 PSLF retains an exclusive con-
tract with PHEAA to administer loans for which borrowers seek forgive-
ness under the PSLF.229
From 2007 to 2010, James Reavis attended the University of Montana
School of Law and obtained a juris doctor.230 Reavis continued to study at
the Monterey Institute of International Studies for two more years where he
obtained a master’s degree in Public Administration in 2012.231 In the sum-
mers of 2010 and 2011, Reavis attended language courses.232 Reavis funded
all of these graduate courses with student loans.233
In 2012, Reavis consolidated his student loans into federal direct loans
to guarantee his loans would qualify for forgiveness under the PSLF.234 He
began working for the Montana Office of the Public Defender (“OPD”),
which remains a qualifying public service employer under the PSLF.235
Reavis made all payments on time and in the amounts designated under the
PSLF.236 However, Reavis alleged PHEAA has failed to correctly account
for his payments.237 PHEAA broke Reavis’s loans into a series of loan se-
quences.238 Reavis claims that he had made 65 qualifying payments be-
tween June 2012 and the filing of his complaint, but PHEAA reported to
Reavis that he has made between 34 and 54 qualifying payments on the
different loan sequences.239
Reavis also claimed the PHEAA furnished him conflicting information
about the amount due during each pay period and his income-based repay-
ment plan.240 The income-based repayment plan required Reavis to regu-
larly update information related to his employment.241 Reavis alleged he
accurately reported to PHEAA his employment information between 2012
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ber 2017, rather than May 2018 as Reavis expected.243 PHEAA did not
notify Reavis that his plan only qualified through October 2017.244 Reavis
changed his income-based repayment plan to Revised Pay As You Earn
(“REPAYE”) upon PHEAA’s recommendation.245 Additionally, PHEAA’s
online system neglected to accept payments made on a Saturday until the
following Monday.246
Reavis sued PHEAA in Lewis and Clark County District Court and
made several state law claims: (1) PHEAA violated the Consumer Protec-
tion Act; (2) PHEAA negligently accounted Reavis’s payments; (3)
PHEAA engaged in deceit, negligent misrepresentation, or constructive
fraud; and (4) PHEAA breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.247 Reavis sought declaratory relief regarding the number of quali-
fying payments he has made under the PSLF.248 PHEAA moved to dismiss
Reavis’s claims, arguing that the HEA preempted all of Reavis’s claims.249
Judge Michael F. McMahon granted PHEAA’s motion to dismiss and
held that the HEA expressly preempted Reavis’s claims.250 The district
court construed 20 U.S.C. § 1098g as grounds for dismissing Reavis’s
claims.251 This statute preempts any state law disclosure requirements on
federal loan servicers.252 The district court held that Reavis’s claims arose
from and related to PHEAA’s disclosures or non-disclosures to Reavis.253
The district court determined that state law claims that a servicer mis-
presented a business practice remain expressly preempted by federal statute
because the claims are contrary to a state law requirement to make alternate
disclosures.254
The Montana Supreme Court dispensed with the district court’s inter-
pretation of Reavis’s claims as disclosures based on the theory of express
preemption.255 Express preemption applies when Congress clearly states its
intention to preempt state law through explicit statutory language.256 The
Court started its analysis at the Supremacy Clause: “the historic police pow-







249. Id.; M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
250. Reavis, 467 P.3d at 591.
251. Id. at 592.
252. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C § 1098g).
253. Reavis, 467 P.3d at 592.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 593.
256. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990).
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clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”257 The Court analyzed the pur-
pose of Congress by looking at the “text and structure of the statute at is-
sue” because Congress’s intent to preempt state law may be stated expressly
or implied in the statute’s structure and purpose.258 The Court determined
the HEA does not define “disclosure requirements” and interpreted its defi-
nition within the context of 20 U.S.C. § 1083.259 Section 1083 refers to
HEA’s disclosure requirements that certain information be communicated
to borrowers during the various stages of the loan.260 The Court held the
“domain” of § 1098g preempts the type of disclosures to borrowers that
§ 1083 requires.261 The Court therefore held that Reavis challenged actions
made by PHEAA rather than improper disclosures made by PHEAA.262
The Court disagreed with the district court’s special deference to the
DoEd’s 2018 informal guide.263 The DoEd expressed its opinion that the
HEA preempts all state regulations that impact federal loan servicing.264
The Court sided with federal court decisions that the DoEd’s guidance “has
little persuasive value and should be given little weight.”265 The Court
therefore held that the HEA does not expressly preempt Reavis’s claims as
pleaded.266
The Court continued its analysis of Reavis’s claims within the context
of conflict preemption, unlike the district court.267 Conflict preemption ap-
plies when an actual conflict between state and federal law exists and thus it
is impossible to obey both laws or when state law interferes to fully accom-
plishing Congress’s objectives.268 PHEAA argued that subjecting PHEAA
to the “disparate laws of fifty states” would thwart Congress’s objective of
uniformity in the federal student loan system.269 The Court decided that the
HEA’s structure does not support PHEAA’s argument under a theory of
257. Reavis, 467 P.3d at 592 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).
258. Id. (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) and citing Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
259. Id. at 593; 20 U.S.C. § 1098g (providing that “loans made, insured, or guaranteed pursuant to a
program authorized by Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 shall not be subject to any disclo-
sure requirements of any State law”).
260. Reavis, 467 P.3d at 592 (citing Lawson-Ross v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp., 955 F.3d 908,
917 (11th Cir. 2020); 20 U.S.C. § 1083(a)-(b).
261. Id. at 593.
262. Id. (noting that PHEAA failing to accurately account for Reavis’s payments constitutes an ac-
tion, not a disclosure).
263. Id. at 594; The guide is entitled “Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of
Education’s Federal Student Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servers.”
264. Id.
265. Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)).
269. Reavis, 467 P.3d at 594.
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conflict preemption because the express preemption provisions in the HEA
demonstrate that Congress considered preemption issues when drafting the
statutory language.270 The Court determined that it must enforce the express
preemption provisions rather than adding to them.271 The Court also held
that state law prohibitions against the types of claims Reavis made, such as
unfair, deceptive, or negligent conduct, will not harm the HEA’s uniform
requirements for federal student loan programs.272 The Court ultimately
held that conflict preemption does not apply to Reavis’s claims.273
In consideration of the Court’s decision in Reavis, Montana practition-
ers must recognize that Montana law claims made by a borrower of federal
student loans against a private loan servicer will survive a motion to dismiss
on the grounds of express and conflict preemption because the HEA does
not preempt state law claims. The express preemption analysis largely de-
pends on whether the private loan servicer failed to disclose information to
the borrower or whether the servicer failed to act on behalf of the borrower.
Practitioners should understand that state law claims will also survive a
challenge of conflict preemption because the Montana Supreme Court held
that Congress need not achieve an objective of uniformity within the federal
student loan system.
––Anne M. Lewis
VII. STATE V. RUNNING WOLF274
In State v. Running Wolf, the Montana Supreme Court held that the
2015 version of a Persistent Felony Offender (“PFO”) statute applied at the
defendant’s 2017 sentencing hearing.275 However, the majority held that the
defendant cannot be designated as a PFO because the defendant had never
been convicted of a felony offense before his sentencing for his Driving
Under the Influence (“DUI”) felony offenses.276 The Court affirmed the
district court’s judgment in part, reversed in part, and remanded with in-
structions to strike the defendant’s designation as a PFO.277 This decision
overruled State v. Williamson,278 State v. Hamm,279 and State v. Ander-
son.280
270. Id. (listing several express preemption provisions).
271. Reavis, 467 P.3d at 594.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 595.
274. 457 P.3d 218 (Mont. 2020).
275. Id. at 226; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-501 (2015).
276. Running Wolf, 457 P.3d at 226.
277. Id.
278. 707 P.2d 530 (Mont. 1985).
279. 818 P.2d 830 (Mont. 1991).
280. 203 P.3d 764 (Mont. 2009).
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The purpose of PFO designation and the corresponding enhanced
sentences is meant to impose punishment for recidivists who continuously
fail to reform their criminal behavior.281 The Court identified the “funda-
mental purpose” of enhanced sentencing statutes as a way to identify de-
fendants who fail to correct their behavior after prior convictions and to
incarcerate such defendants for a longer time period to protect the commu-
nity and deter similar behavior in society.282 Enhanced penalty statutes
therefore provide defendants fair warnings if they continue to commit crim-
inal acts after gaining the opportunity to reform their criminal acts.283
This case addresses a PFO designation under Montana Code Anno-
tated § 46-18-501 and incorporation of a new definition of a PFO under a
2017 statute.284 Section 46-18-501 defined a “persistent felony offender” as
“an offender who has previously been convicted of a felony and who is
presently being sentenced for a second felony if less than five years have
elapsed between the commission of the present offense and either: (a) the
previous felony conviction; or (b) the offender’s release on parole or other-
wise from prison or other commitment imposed as a result of the previous
felony conviction.”285 The statutory language of “previously been con-
victed” required that a second felony be committed on a different occasion
than the first and within five years.286 The Legislature enacted House Bill
133 (“HB 133”), which expressly preserved the application of the 2015
PFO statute to offenses committed before July 1, 2017.287 The 2017 statute
provides that a PFO means “an offender who has previously been convicted
of two separate felonies and who is presently being sentenced for a third
felony committed on a different occasion than either of the first two felo-
nies.”288 An offender is considered to have “previously been convicted” of
two separate felonies “if less than five years have elapsed between the com-
mission of the present offense and the most recent of the two felony convic-
tions.”289 Section 46-1-202(18) requires that one of the three felonies must
be a sexual offense or a violent offense.290
The facts here started on January 28, 2015 when law enforcement ar-
rested the defendant, Running Wolf.291 The State charged Running Wolf
281. Running Wolf, 457 P.3d at 225.
282. Id. at 226.
283. Id.
284. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-1-202(18) (2017).
285. § 46-18-501 (emphasis added).
286. Running Wolf, 457 P.3d at 226 (citing Williamson, 707 P.2d at 532–33).




291. Running Wolf, 457 P.3d at 220.
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with his fourth DUI offense.292 Law enforcement arrested Running Wolf
again, and he was charged with his fifth DUI offense and separate misde-
meanor offense on May 1, 2015 while the fourth DUI charge was still pend-
ing.293 Running Wolf had three prior misdemeanor DUI convictions from
2005, 2009 and 2011.294 The State charged Running Wolf’s January and
May 2015 DUI offenses as felonies because a fourth or subsequent DUI
constitutes a felony under Montana law at the time. Before Running Wolf
was convicted of either felony following the May 2015 charges, the State
gave notice that it intended to seek PFO designation.295
On July 14, 2017 Running Wolf pleaded guilty to both felony DUIs,
approximately two weeks after the 2017 PFO statute took effect.296 The
district court conducted Running Wolf’s sentencing hearing on October 30,
2017 and concluded that the 2015 PFO statute applied because the 2015
statute was in effect during the time Running Wolf “committed his underly-
ing offenses.”297 The district court sentenced Running Wolf for two felony
DUI offenses from his fourth DUI offense on January 28, 2015 and his fifth
DUI offense from May 1, 2015.298 The district court used Running Wolf’s
fourth DUI offense from January as the predicate offense to enhance Run-
ning Wolf’s punishment for the May DUI offense under § 46-18-501.299 As
a result, Running Wolf received a straight ten-year sentence without ever
having the opportunity to participate in a sobriety program or receive other
alcohol abuse treatment to help reform his criminal behavior.300
Running Wolf appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court
lacked authority to designate him as a PFO under the 2015 statute because
the 2017 version applied on the date of his sentencing.301 Running Wolf
also contended, even if the 2015 statute applied, that the district court erred
because “the PFO statute requires an offender to have a felony conviction
before committing the offense for which the PFO designation is sought.”302
Running Wolf asserted that he had no “previous felony conviction” upon
which the district court could base his PFO designation because the district
court entered judgment on his fourth and fifth DUI offenses during the









300. Id. at 220–221.
301. Id. at 221.
302. Id. at 222.
303. Id.
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Court to overrule its decisions in Williamson, Hamm, and Anderson because
Williamson and its progeny prove inconsistent with the majority of other
jurisdictions that have held that the basis for a PFO designation for a felony
conviction “must precede commission of the principal offense.”304 Running
Wolf contended that the plain language of the 2015 statute demonstrates the
Legislature’s intent to assign a PFO designation only when the defendant
has a felony conviction that existed before commission of the offense that
provides basis for the PFO designation.305 In contrast, the State directed the
Court to Williamson because in Williamson the Court held that the statutory
language “previously been convicted” requires a second felony to be com-
mitted on a different occasion than the first and within five years of the first
felony.306 The State emphasized that the Court affirmed the Williamson de-
cision twice, in Hamm and Anderson.307
The Supreme Court resolved the first issue regarding whether the 2015
PFO statute applied to Running Wolf’s sentencing in 2017 by a recent deci-
sion in State v. Thomas.308 In Thomas, the State charged Thomas with a
felony DUI arising from an incident that allegedly occurred on July 23,
2016.309 The State sought PFO designation for Thomas based on a prior
felony escape conviction.310 The district court sentenced Thomas as a PFO
under the 2015 statute, although the jury convicted Thomas of a DUI felony
in January 2017.311 Thomas received a ten-year prison sentence.312 Thomas
appealed, and the Supreme Court held that the plain language of HB 133
explicitly expressed the Legislature’s intent to refrain from applying the
revisions enacted by HB 133 to offenses committed before July 1, 2017.313
The Court in Running Wolf held that Running Wolf presented the same issue
and arguments raised in Thomas, therefore compelling the Court to make
the same conclusion as the district court that the 2015 PFO statute correctly
applied at Running Wolf’s October 30, 2017 sentencing hearing.314
The Court further addressed the issue on whether the PFO statute re-
quired the predicate felony conviction upon which the PFO status is based
to precede the commission of the principal offense.315 The majority used a
plain language analysis to interpret the express language of § 46-18-501 to
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. (citing State v. Williamson, 707 P.2d 530 (Mont. 1985)).
307. Id. (citing State v. Hamm, 818 P.2d 830 (1991); State v. Anderson, 203 P.3d 764 (2009)).
308. Running Wolf, 457 P.3d at 221; 445 P.3d 777 (Mont. 2019).
309. Thomas, 445 P.3d at 778.
310. Id.
311. Id.; § 46-18-501.
312. Thomas, 445 P.3d at 778.
313. Id.
314. Running Wolf, 457 P.3d at 221.
315. Id.
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determine the intent of the Legislature.316 The Court stated that it cannot
“go further and apply any other means of interpretation” if it can determine
the plain meaning of the words used in a statute.317 The Court held that the
plain language of the 2015 PFO statute expressly requires the existence of a
felony conviction before the commission of the principle offense upon the
basis of a valid PFO designation.318
The majority held that Williamson directly contradicts the express re-
quirements of § 46-18-501.319 In Williamson, the defendant argued he could
not be designated as a PFO because he committed his two felony offenses at
approximately the same time, and he entered his pleas at the same time.320
The majority of the Court critiqued its rationale in Williamson because the
Williamson decision disregarded the plain, clear, and unambiguous statu-
tory language.321 The Court in Williamson grounded its disregard for the
plain meaning of the statute based in fear that “to hold otherwise would
provide criminals unfettered license to commit all manner of felonies with-
out adequate consequence” between the commission of a first felony and
the subsequent conviction on that felony.322 In Running Wolf, the Court
decided that its role is not to insert what has been omitted in statutory lan-
guage but to interpret the statute “in accordance with its plain meaning.”323
The Court overruled Williamson and its progeny because Williamson cre-
ated a “falsely exaggerated scenario” that the legislature did not intend to
address in the statute.324
Justice Baker concurred and dissented, arguing that the majority
should have followed the decisions in Williamson, Hamm, and Anderson
under the theory of stare decisis.325 Justice Baker noted that the Court in
Williamson rejected a plain language interpretation of “previously been
convicted” because the statute would have given an offender “a sort of
‘window of opportunity’ to commit additional crimes before being sen-
tenced on his first felony and be immune from [PFO] designation because
the [five-year] clock does not start running until after the first convic-
tion.”326 Justice Baker emphasized that the Legislature did not intend to
provide such an “open season” for criminals to run free.327 Justice Baker
316. Id. at 222.
317. Id. (citing State v. Gatts, 928 P.2d 114, 117 (Mont. 1996)).
318. Id. at 223.
319. Id. at 223.
320. State v. Williamson, 707 P.2d 530, 532 (Mont. 1985).
321. Running Wolf, 457 P.3d at 223.
322. Id. (referencing Williamson, 707 P.2d at 532–33).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 227.
326. Id. (quoting State v. Williamson, 707 P.2d 530, 532–33 (Mont. 1985)).
327. Id. (quoting Williamson, 707 P.2d at 533).
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contended that the Legislature has the responsibility to cure the Court’s
mistakes if the Legislature determines the Court misconstrued the PFO stat-
utes in Williamson, Hamm, and Anderson.328
Justice Rice joined in Justice Baker’s concurrence and dissent, arguing
that the majority rejected 30 years’ worth of deliberations by the Court.329
Justice Rice reiterated the application of stare decisis, which he asserted
teaches the Court that it must use its ability to overrule precedent spar-
ingly.330 Justice Rice stated that the Court can overturn incorrect precedent
only “where departure therefore can be made without unduly affecting con-
tract rights or other interests calling for consideration.”331 Justice Rice
noted that in Running Wolf, charges had been assessed and filed and crimi-
nal proceedings had been undertaken “pursuant to our precedential interpre-
tation of the PFO statutes.”332 Justice Rice stated that the
Legislature expressly chose not to revise the Court’s 35-year interpre-
tation of PFO statutes and qualifying offenses, and as such, the Court’s
decisions since 1985 have “repeatedly and fairly warned everyone, includ-
ing Running Wolf” that committing multiple felonies may result in en-
hanced penalty.333
Justice Shea joined in Justice Baker’s and Justice Rice’s concurrences
and dissents, articulating that the “manifestly wrong” standard raises the bar
substantially and stating that the majority’s interpretation of § 46-18-501
does not rise to the level of “manifestly wrong.”334 Justice Shea noted that
the Court’s precedents have allowed the previous felony conviction to be
committed “mere seconds before the sentence imposed for the second fel-
ony, irrespective of whether the previous felony conviction occurred before
the commission of the second felony.”335 Justice Shea determined that the
interpretation of “persistent felony offender,” which hinges on whether an
offender has been considered to have been “previously convicted of a fel-
ony,” does not prove to be “manifestly wrong.”336
In conclusion, Montana legal practitioners can expect the Court to fol-
low a plain language analysis regarding PFO statutes.337 The Court deter-
mined that it cannot draw any inference from the Legislature’s silence that
remains inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and cannot serve
328. Id. at 228.
329. Id. at 229.
330. Id. at 230 (citing Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 465 (2015)).
331. Id.
332. Id.




337. Id. at 225.
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as “a justification to perpetuate a manifestly wrong interpretation of § 46-
18-501.”338 As a result of the Running Wolf decision, Montana lawyers
must know that Williamson, Hamm, and Anderson no longer remain good
law, and that Montana law now requires that a felony conviction must occur
before the commission of the principal offense before designating an of-
fender as a PFO with an attached sentencing enhancement.339
––Anne M. Lewis
338. Id.
339. Id. at 226.
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